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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

INTERMOUNTAIN FARMERS
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff

&

Appellant,

vs.
JIM FITZGERALD,

Defendant

&

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 14723

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a money judgment in favor of defendant on a Counterclaim. The case was brought by plaintiff to recover the amount due to it on an
open account for sale of feed to defendant. Some months later, defendant was
permitted to file an Amended Answer and Counterclaim for injuries and death to
his dairy herd allegedly caused by toxic levels of urea and alleged inconsistencies
and deficiency of protein in the feed.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
After a nine day trial before a jury, Judgments on the Special Verdict of
the jury in favor of plaintiff on its Complaint in the amount of $44, 175 .00, and for
defendant on his Counterclaim in the amount of $226 ,330. 57, were made and entered
on May 19, 19 76, by the Court, Hon. Gordon R. Hall, presiding. Thereafter, on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

July 20, 1976, the lower court denied Motions by plaintiff for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial. The Judgment in favor of plaintiff was not
appealed.
RELIBF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order reversing the Judgment in favor of defendant on
the Counterclaim as a matter of law, and award of attorney's fees on the Judgment
in plaintiff's favor. In the alternative, plaintiff seeks a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The transcript in this case is voluminous, so it has been abstracted pursuant to order of this Court. References hereinafter to the testimony at trial are
to the Transcript (Tr.) and to the Abstract (Ab.) Other references are to the
Record (R. ) •
Plaintiff as an agricultural cooperative association sold "14% Dairy Feed"
to defendant on an open account. Sales were made by invoice, and the total of
unpaid invoices plus interest on the running open account amounted to $44,175.0~
The invoices provided for attorney's fees, and the defendant admitted knowledge
of that fact.

(Tr. 9 71; Ab. 129) The feed was delivered to the defendant's farm

from the Spanish Fork branch of lntermountain Farmers Association.
The feed plaintiff sold to defendant was always "14% Dairy Feed" comprised
basically of rolled grains, plus a 32% supplement and molasses. (Tr. 223; Ab.
2) The 32% supplement which was added to the 14% dairy feed was obtained from
the Draper branch of plaintiff, and was mixed at the Spanish Fork plant using

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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either 300 or 350 pounds per ton of the 32% supplement, depending upon the formula
being used at the time .
The defendant claimed at trial that his dairy herd became beset with bloat,
loss of milk production and other problems including death, and that such problems were caused by the feed purchased from plaintiff. The first seven counts
of defendant's Counterclaim alleged that plaintiff's feed had a usable protein
deficiency , that there was an inconsistent usable protein content, and that the
feed contained excess urea. Count Eight asked for punitive damages for willfully
and intentionally manufacturing and selling to defendant feed containing deficient
protein and excess urea, after having been informed that its labels were false and
misleading. As presented in Special Interrogatories, the jury was asked to
determine whether the feed delivered by plaintiff "contained levels of urea and
protein inconsistent with its guarantee." (R. 140) The "guarantee" referred to
was the label or tag provided by plaintiff setting forth the chemical analysis of
the feed for sale. The theory of defendant's Counterclaim was alleged negligence
in mixing and providing the 14% dairy feed, not breach of warranty or "guarantee."
(R. 23-28; Tr. 841; Ab. 173)

Productivity of Defendant's Dairy Herd
Defendant used plaintiff's feed less than three years in total time. (13
months between February 1971 and February 1972, and 19 months between
December 1972 and July 1974) Over that three year period, defendant moved
his dairy herd from American Fork to Elberta where he built a large, modem
dairy complex. Defendant also increased his herd from the 80 cows he had

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
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initially purchased in an estate settlement to approximately 300 cows. At the
time defendant began feeding his cows IFA feed, the yearly average milk production per cow of his dairy herd was 372 pounds less than the Salt Lake County
average. During the periods of time that defendant's cows were consuming the
allegedly contaminated feed purchased from plaintiff, the milk production of defen
herd increased steadily, and by 1974 exceeded the Salt Lake County average by
1,688 pounds per cow. The uncontradicted evidence (Exhibit 63-P) in this regard
was as follows:
Average lbs . Milk
Per Year Per Cow
Defendant's Dai!:I Cows

Difference

Average lbs. Milk
Per Year Per Cow
Salt Lake Coun~

12,584
14,544
14,454
14,320
14,675
15,153

-372
+1,358
+l,062
+1,230
+1,688
+l,657

12,956
13,186
13,392
13,090
12,987
13,496

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

No Evidence of Harmful Feed Actually Purchased by Defendant
The uncontroverted evidence is that the defendant purchased 14% Dairy
Feed from the plaintiff during two periods of time, the first, between February 11.
1971, and January 5, 1972, and the second, between December 28, 1972 andJufy
26, 1974.
There was no direct evidence by way of chemical test or otherwise that
any of the loads of 14% Dairy Feed actually purchased by defendant during the
aforesaid periods when his cows were feeding was h.armful. During the time
periods in question, no tests by the State Chemist were taken of feed sold at the
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Spanish Fork branch. During the relevant time periods, only eleven of the 77
tests by the office of the Utah State Chemist finally admitted into evidence were
analyses of 14% Dairy Feed samples, all of which were taken at locations other
than the Spanish Fork branch of plaintiff. I) According to both parties' expert
witnesses, Drs. Gardner and Huber, none of the chemical tests on 14% dairy feed
showed an excess of urea which would cause a loss of milk production, or any
other of the symptoms of toxicity complained of by defendant. (Tr. 795 ,877; Ab. 121,20i
Evidence of Alleged Contamination of 32% Supplement Which Could Have Been
Mixed Into Feed Purchased by Defendant
There was no direct evidence that any contaminated 32% supplement or concentrate was in fact mixed into the feed which defendant purchased. Of the total
of 772) chemical tests which were received into evidence, 24 represented test

1) Many tests were taken of samples of plaintiff's feed which were never admitted
into evidence. Of the 77 chemical tests admitted into evidence, 26 were tests of
14% Dairy Feed. Those 26 tests may be analyzed as follows:
Taken before or after relevant time periods - 15 tests
Taken during the relevant time periods - 11 tests
Taken at branches of IFA other than Spanish Fork during the relevant
time periods - 11 tests; before or after the relevant time periods 12 tests
Taken at Spanish Fork IFA Branch during the relevant time periods - no
tests; before or after the relevant time periods - 3 tests
Comment made by State Chemist that sample showed an excess of NPN
(urea) on tests taken during the relevant time periods - none; on
tests taken before or after the relevant time periods - 2 tests (neither
of which was taken at Spanish Fork)

I'

2) Many tests were taken of samples of plaintiff's feed supplement which were
never admitted into evidence. Of the 77 chemical tests admitted into evidence, 51 were
tests of 32% feed supplement. Those 51 tests may be analyzed as follows:
Taken before or after relevant time periods - 27 tests
Taken during the relevant time periods - 24 tests
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samples of 32% supplement taken during the relevant time periods

·

Furth

two of the tests during the relevant time periods indicated an excess of u

er, onc

rea, an

those two tests were of samples taken at branches other than Spanish Fork.

Defendant's witness, Dr. Robert Gardner, testified that two of the 24samp

tested during the time periods in question contained sufficient excess urea to caw

the type of problems complained of by the defendant. One of those chemical tes~.

Exhibit 130-D, test report number 9870, was an analysis of 32% dairy concentrate

sampled from the St. George branch ofIFA on February 18, 1971, seven daysafte

the defendant began using plaintiff's feed. The other test, Exhibit 116-D, was an

analysis of 32% cattle supplement sampled from the Draper branch of IFA on Ju~I

1974, one day before defendant quit using plaintiff's feed. No testimony or evid1
was presented that the concentrate identified in Exhibit 130-D, or the cattle sup-

plement identified in Exhibit 116-D, was in fact used in the preparation at SpanW
Fork of any of the feed which the defendant's cows ate.
Evidence of Alleged Contamination of Feed at Other Times and Other Places
Which Could Not Have Been Purchased by Defendant
Chemical tests which were taken at branches other than the Spanish Fork
branch of IFA, at times both prior and subsequent to the periods when defendant'

Taken at branches of IFA other than Spanish Fork during the relevant
time periods - 26 tests; before or after the relevant time periods·
24 tests
Taken at Spanish Fork IFA branch during the relevant time periods · n0
tests; before or after the relevant time periods - 1 test
PN
Comment made by State Chemist that sample showed an excess ofN
(urea) on tests taken during the relevant time periods - 2 tests
(neither of which was taken from Spanish Fork); on tests tak~~
before or after the relevant time periods - 4 tests (none of whi
was taken at Spanish Fork)
~
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cows were feeding on plaintiff's feed, were admitted into evidence over objection
of plaintiff's counsel. Counsel for defendant often offered these remote exhibits
for the limited purpose of showing alleged knowledge or notice on the part of IFA

as related to Count Eight for punitive damages. Tests taken after the periods of
feeding which were admitted over objection of counsel include Exhibits 12-D, 13D, 14-D, 15-D, 16-D, 110-D, 111-D, 112-D, 113-D, 114-D, 115-D, 125-D, 126-D,

127-D and 129-D (test report numbers 2779, 2746 and 4975) and 130-D (test report
numbers 75-2833 and 75-3670). The Transcript shows the following relative to
Exhibits 13 through 16:

I!

MR. BLONQUIST: Offer 13.
MR. CONDIB: Your Honor, I would object to this. This is
approximately six months from the time the feed was purchased by
the defendant and is from a branch other than Spanish Fork; totally
irrelevant and I don't know for what purpose it could be admissible
consistent with the pleadings in this case.
·
MR. BLONQUIST: Briefly that there was notic~ given and
no move upon the part of Intermountain Farmers to--I think this
ties into the punitive element.
THE COURT: This is some substantial time after the period
of time that we are concerned with in this case. (Tr. 271; Ab. 12)

***
MR. BLONQUIST: We would offer 14.
MR. CONDIB: I would object on the same grounds, Your
Honor. This covers a period of time after the feed was pur~ased
from the plaintiff and is a test from a branch other than Spanish
Fork. (Tr. 272; Ab. 13)

***
MR. BLONQUIST: We will offer 15.
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MR. CONDIE: Same objection, Your Honor. It covers a
period after the time the feed was purchased and from a branch
other than Intermountain Farmers Association, (sic] June 11th,
1975. (Tr. 273; Ab. 13)

***
MR. BLONQUIST: We would offer 16.
MR. CONDIE: Same objection, Your Honor.
Ab. 13)

(Tr. 274;

These exhibits and all other exhibits taken subsequent to the time defendant
stopped buying plaintiff's feed were offered as solely relating to punitive

darnag~

(Tr. 502; Ab. 57), but were admitted into evidence generally over objection of
counsel.

(Tr. 276; Ab. 13)

Similarly, exhibits taken prior to the time periods during which defendanl
fed his cows plaintiff's feed were offered solely as related to the punitive damage
element, but were admitted over objection of counsel.

(Exhibits 4-D, 5-D, 11-D,

89-D, 90-D , 92-D, 94-D , 95-D , 99-D , 100-D , 104-D, 128-D (test report numbers
6263 and 4090), 129-D (test report numbers 9066 and 4804), 130-D (test report
numbers 3333, 5204, 5624, 5 722, 6722 and 9061) and Exhibit 149-D l For instance,
with reference to samples taken in 1970 as set forth in Exhibit 149-D, the transcrii:
reads:
MR. BLONQUIST: We would offer 149 which consists of
four pieces of paper; 149 and then number 70-5624, 70-6271,
and 70-280.
MR. CONDIE: Your Honor, I would object to their admission on two grounds; They cover a period of time not in question
and number two, they cover feed which there is no testimony to
support has ever been used by the defendant's cows.
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MR. BLONQUIST: If you will recall, Your Honor, this
issue was raised to all of the tests for the year 1970; and pursuant to Mr. Condie's objections I withdrew those exhibits. The
only ones I seek to show now are just those four which go to the
question of whether or not prior to the time Mr. Fitzgerald bought
feed from Intermountain Farmers Association they had knowledge
that their feed did not comply with the label, and it is for that limited
purpose that they are offered. He objected to all of them and I believe
that that was a proper objection; we are now going to the issue of
knowledge and the fact that they were notified that the guarantee
was not met, which I think goes to the essential elements of this
case. (Tr. 817; Ab. 126)
Again, the chemical tests relating to these samples were received into evidence
generally over objection. (Tr. 818; Ab. 127) This particular exhibit contained
the following notation under date of May 4, 1970 from the State Chemist's office:
"This label is false and misleading .

We have encountered a number of these

during this year."
Similar discussion was had resulting in ultimate receipt into evidence of
other chemical tests which admittedly could not possibly

hav~

related to alleged

contamination of the feed actually purchased by defendant. (Tr. 502-504; Ab.
57)

Confusion as to the Use and Purpose of Exhibits Which Could Not Show and
Were Not Offered to Show that the Feed Purchased and Used by Defendant
was Contaminated
The bulk of the chemical tests admitted into evidence related only to Count
Eight, punitive damages. All test reports prior and subsequent to the periods
in question were offered for the limited purpose of establishing plaintiff's alleged

knowledge and notice justifying punitive damages. (Tr. 817; Ab. 126; Tr. 502;
Ab. 57) [Exhibits 4-D, 5-D, 11-D, 12-D, 13-D, 14-D, 15-D, 16-D, 89-D, 90-D •
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92-D, 94-D, 95-D, 99-D, 100-D, 104-D, 110-D, 111-D, 112-D, 113-D, 114-D
'

115-D, 125-D, 126-D, 127-D, 128-D (test report numbers 6263 and 4090), 129·D
(test report numbers 9066, 2779, 2746 and 4804), Exhibit 130-D (test report numbers 3333, 5204, 5624, 5722, 6722, 9061, 75-2833 and 75-3670) and Exhibit 149-DJ
Exhibit 12-D , a sample taken after defendant stopped purchasing feed from
IFA, on August 15, 1974, was one such exhibit in the aforesaid category which
could not have caused contamination in the actual feed, and could not have been
a component ingredient of the actual feed used by defendant. The Court initially
admitted Exhibit 12 into evidence without restriction, but at a later point in the
trial apparently sustained objection as to its applicability and use for purposes
other than punitive damages. The record shows the following:
MR. BLONQUIST: We would offer Exhibit 12.
MR. coNDm: I would object to the introduction of this
exhibit, Your Honor. It covers a time subsequent to the time
when the defendant purchased feed from Intermountain Farmers;
and is also from a branch which is not Spanish Fork.

THE COURT:
Ab. 12)

12 is received over that objection. (Tr. 270;

***
MR. BLONQUIST: Referring Your Honor to Exhibit 12-D
and it is specifically, the record will show , sampled on August
15th of 1974 which is within the time in question in this case.
MR. CONDm: Your Honor (this) is one month after they
quit using Intermountain Farmers Associatio_n feed'. and therefore no cow in his dairy could have eaten this particular sample
or anything like it. . . .

THE COURT: Yes. Doesn't appear to be within the time
that is in question and the objection is sustained.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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MR. BLONQUIST: Your Honor, I think in ruling on that
the Court also ought to take into consideration the other elements.
oft.he case we have talked about earlier; that was the basis upon
which the Court allowed the exhibit in at the beginning of this
litigation. That was the fact that one of our charges in this case
was one of the punitive or exemplary damages . And the notice
that was involved certainly goes to that issue and that close in
time because with that element of the case, Your Honor, I think
would make the document clearly admissible.
I, also I failed to mention that in my argument I would ask
the Court to reconsider in considering that ground.
MR. CONDIE: Your Honor, I'll stipulate and it is in the
record that that particular document shows what it shows. If
that's notice then it is notice. But I don't believe any testimony
relative to these percentage questions of a feed which his cows
could never have eaten is relevant.
THE COURT: The ruling will stand. (Tr. 710, 711; Ab. 99)
There was confusion as to the use and scope of exhibits other than Exhibit
12-D

which were identified, objected to, a ruling reserved, admitted without

restriction and later restricted in some partieular. [See Exhibit 15-D; Tr. 704,
711; Ab. 98, 99; and Exhibit 129-D (testreportnumber9068); Tr. 900; Ab. 209.]

Against this background and confusion as to the limitations suggested in
the presence of the jury, the court recognized the need for some curative instruclion so as to give guidance to the jury in its deliberations. Many exhibits had been
admitted and discussed before the jury for the sole purpose of showing alleged
punitive damages . Without identifying the exhibits in question, the court gave
the following instruction to the jury:
You are instructed that certain exhibits hereinafter
enumerated have been offered and admitted into evidence by
the court as bearing upon the question of notice to the plaintiff
of a deficiency in its feed. You are instructed that said exhibits
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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should not be considered for any other purpose or as bearing
upon any other issue and do not constitute proof of any other
claim made by the counterclaimant in this case. (Instruction No.
20, R. 121)
Although the instruction was given as aforesaid, in fact there was no enumer31il
as to the exhibits referred to in the instruction. The jury was left without
any guidance or instruction as to which exhibits were so restricted. Neverthelesi
all exhibits were taken into the jury room without notation or indication as to whi~
were so restricted or limited.
Jury was Permitted to Regard any Evidence of "Misbranding" or "Adulteration'
of Feed as Constituting Negligence Per Se
The Court gave the following instructions, which were strenuously objectei
to:
Section 4-18-18 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) states
as follows:
Misbranded feed. -- No person shall distribute
misbranded feed. A commercial feed shall be
deemed to be misbranded: If its labeling is false
or misleading in any particular.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
plaintiff misbranded its feed sold to the defendant in violation
of the statute just read to you, which is proposed for the safety
of defendant and others who own dairy cows , such conduct
constituted negligence as a matter of law. (Instruction No.
16 , R . 11 7) [Emphasis added . 1

***
Section 4-18-17 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) reads
as follows:
Adulterated feed. -- No person shall distribute
an adulterated feed. A commercial feed or custom
mix feed shall be deemed to be adulterated:
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1. If any poisonous, deleterious or non-nutritive
ingredient has been added in sufficient amount to
render it injurious to health when fed in accordance
with directions for use on the label.

2. If any valuable constituent has been in whole or
part omitted or abstracted therefrom or any less
valuable substance substituted therefor.
3. If its composition of quality falls below or differs
from that which it is purported or is represented to
possess by its labeling.
4. If it contains added hulls, screenings, straw , cobs,
or other high fiber material unless the name of each
such material is stated on the label.

ii'

Ii
1,1

iI
1

1,1

;.

If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
plaintiff manufactured and sold feed to the defendant in viDtation
of the statute just read to you, which is proposed for the safety
of defendant and others who own dairy cows , such conduct
constitutes negligence as a matter of law. (Instruction No.
17 , R . 118) [Emphasis added.]

i!

/
1:1

1:1

l!I,.

1"

i

Ii i

There was no curative or other instruction to indicate that any evidence whatso-

//ii

ever, other than some evidence of misbranding or adulterati9n, would be necessary

11

1:

in order for the jury to determine the existence of negligence. Nor were the above

1'I

,.,

I"

instructions limited to consideration of defendant's Count VIII regarding punitive

1

11

·!]

damages which is the only Count raising the issue of alleged misbranding of feed

1·

by plaintiff.

11

Evidence of Possible Causes of the Alleged Injuries Suffered by Defendant
Other than Contaminated Feed

I

Evidence was presented by several witnesses that reduction in milk production,
bloat and other problems complained of by defendant are most generally caused
•

•

•

i[!I
Iii

by the milker and milking equipment, feeding alfalfa, legumes or clover, mcons1stencies:,:i
'Iii
!

"

,'i
I
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in feeding and milking procedures, seasonal changes and weather conditions,

changing the location of the herd, introducing new cows into the herd, communicabl
disease among the herd, and a variety of such other common place reasons.

Additi~

evidence was presented that general poor health conditions of a herd results in
low milk production .
According to defendant's own witness, Dr. Gardner, the chief causes of
losses in milk production would include the following:
DR. GARDNER: Weather conditions such as seasonal
changes, communicable diseases in the herd, serious malfunction of the milking equipment so it's injurious to the cows and
affects their milk production. It's things -- changes of milkers -milkers who don't completely remove the milk from the cow . If
a major change in the feeding system so that you say delete grain
from the ration -- semi starve the animal it has a very significant
effect in depressing milk production or any poisonous or toxic
factor that might be in the feed. (Tr. 788; Ab. 106)
Defendant's witness and veterinarian, Dr. Roper, also testified that there
were a number of reasons for milk production fluctuation including inadequate
feedings, insufficient milkings, the cows' hooves being sore, a dog chasing the
cows all night, the cows being in heat or menstruating, the cows contracting
pneumonia or a hardwear disease, and innumerable other reasons.

(Tr. 269,

570; Ab. 65)

One of the defendant's milkers, Mr. Ed Aragon, testified that consistent
feeding and milking programs are important in maintaining milk production, as
is a consistent personal relationship between the milkers and the cows. Mr. Ar
readily admitted that milkers were usually to blame for milk production fluctuation
stating:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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MR. ARAGON: If you can't keep your production up on
your cows your employer -- you can't remain with him. He
can't keep you because in my experience with milkers and cows,
about 90 percent milk production is a milker, the man that pulls
the milk out of the cow is 90 percent of it as far as I can see. (Tr.
585; Ab. 68)
During the time period in question, Mr. Fitzgerald had employed several
different milkers, including Mr. Aragon (Tr. 583; Ab. 63; Tr. 594; Ab. 69),
Mr. Dallas Schrimer, who had "very little experience as a milker" (Tr. 641; Ab. 81)
and Mr. Harvey Cook.

(Tr. 679; Ab. 89) At times when the herd was still located

in American Fork, Mr. Fitzgerald and his wife also milked the cows.

(Tr. 583;

Ab. 63) In addition to the changes in milkers, defendant's herd of 80 cows was
moved from American Fork to Elberta where new cows were introduced into defendant' s herd until it numbered approximately 300 cows. Defendant then changed
the milking program from twice a day milking to three time milking, and, correspondingly, defendant's feeding program was adjusted so that the cows' consumption
of grain and hay would be markedly increased. Testimony was received that all
such changes in the daily routine of a dairy herd could cause fluctuations in its
milk production.
With respect to the general causes of bloat problems, Dr. Huber testified
that:
. . . the most common cause of bloat is a legume-type bloat;
and this bloat results from consumption of alfalfa primarily;
could be in the pasture, green chop or hay form . Generally
in the green chop will tend toward more bloat than the dry
hay but it has been reported on a number of occasions where
certain alfalfa from that are in the dry hay form and will cause
bloat. (Tr. 884; Ab. 204)
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During the times of purchase and use of plaintiff's 14% dairy feed, defendant also
fed his cows as much as 45 pounds of alfalfa per day. Further, he admitted that
he had had a severe bloat problem in June 1972 which he attributed to the green
chopped alfalfa he had been feeding to his cows.

(Tr. 1020; Ab. 141) In addition

to the alfalfa, defendant fed his cows corn silage during the relevant times ofpur
of 14% dairy feed.
Relative to general poor health conditions of a herd as resulting in milk
production loss, the testimony of Curtis Solomon and Ed Aragon revealed that
the defendant's cows had rough, straggley coats and dull, droopy eyes which is
a symptom of infection in cows. Defendant's cows were unresponsive, hard to
handle and listless, had evidence of mucus in their droppings and were. "in a gen
poor health condition." (Tr. 426; Ab . 40) Defendant also testified that his cows
suffered from udder problems, mastitis, trychosis, pneumonia and other things,
in addition to the problems with bloat that he is claiming losses for.

(Tr. 1145;

Ab. 184)
·Attempted Negation of Possible Causes of Alleged Damage to Defendant's
Herd -- Other than Contaminated Feed
Defendant and his employees testified that during the two periods of time
in question the dairy herd suffered from such various problems as uneasiness,

regurgitation, excessive salivation, bloat, staggering, abortion of their calves,
general poor health and dull eyes.

(Tr. 1013-1014; Ab. 140; Tr. 426; Ab. 40;

Tr. 590-597; Ab. 69, 70; Tr. 647-648, 654-667; Ab. 82-87) The only testimony
presented linking such symptoms to the consumption of excessive amounts of
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urea by dairy cows was that of defendant's witness, Dr. Robert Gardner, and to
a limited extent, that of defendant's veterinarian, Dr. Roper.

(Tr. 695; Ab. 94-

95; Tr. 560; Ab. 63)
In an attempt to eliminate other feed stuffs fed by defendant to his cows as

causative of the damages, evidence was presented showing that the alfalfa, corn
silage, barley and water used by defendant on his farm in Elberta were tested and
analyzed in 1974, at the Woodson-Tenant Laboratories (Tr. 462-467; Ab. 48-49)
and Edward S. Babcock

&

Sons Laboratories (Tr. 473-479; Ab. 50-51). All elements

tested were claimed by defendant's expert witnesses to be within normal ranges
for each such element, but no tests were requested or made as to the urea (NPN)
content, which at trial was asserted to be the prime claimed toxic problem.
A pellet claimed by Curtis Solomon to be a 32% pellet manufactured by

plaintiff was also analyzed by Woodson-Tenant Laboratories (Tr. 451; Ab. 45)
and was shown to have a 24% protein content (Tr. 466; Ab. 48), but again no test
to determine the urea (NPN) content of the pellet was requested or conducted.
(Tr. 468; Ab. 49)

In attempting to negate other factors as possible causes of defendant's
problems, a wholly hypothetical approach was employed. (Tr. 738-742; Ab.
106-107) Referring to defendant's milk production as reflected on Exhibit 136,

a chart prepared by defendant, Dr. Gardner testified as follows:
Q (By Mr. Blonquist): So my question is, do you have
an opinion as to whether that decline is related to weather
conditions?

I

I
I;

:1
1:1

A (By Dr. Gardner): Yes. I do.

i
·1
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Q Would you please tell the jury what your opinion is?

A According to experience I have, the observations
made on dairy herds , this is not a seasonal change as far as
the depression of milk production.

Q And that's for the reason you have stated?
A Right. (The cows usually start increasing their milk
production during the fall months . )

Q Doctor, I would like you to assume . . . there was one
sick cow in the herd. Do you have an opinion as to whether
the sickness of the herd would be responsible for the decline?
A Yes.

Q What is that opinion?
A Obviously not a problem if it had been only one cow
been diagnosed as sick.

Q Assume for a moment, Doctor, during that period that
the owner had the hoofs of their herd trimmed; do you have an
opinion as to whether that would cause the decline shown?
A Yes.

Q What is that opinion?
A If the herd was all trimmed at once you would expect
maybe a period of two weeks where for the animals to recover
if the hoofs have been trimmed so close as that they were tender
and painful for the cow to walk; otherwise, you couldn't expect
a prolonged problem. So I wouldn't in this case, the evidence
would suggest there was not a hoof trimming problem.

Q Doctor, assume that during this period the same person
milked the cows during that time; did you have an opinion as to
whether or not that decline would be responsible to the milker,
responsible for that decline?
A Yes.

Q What is that opinion?
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A I would discount that as an observation to the probable
cause of this decline.

Q You would discount it, but not eliminate it, sir?
A Not eliminate it.
Q Doctor, if, during this period in question the herd
consumed 14 percent dairy feed that had an inconsistent
ingredient of protein equivalent from non-protein nitrogen;
by that I mean high one month and low the next; do you have
an opinion as to whether or not the decline shown on that
exhibit would be a result of the inconsistencies in protein
equivalent from non-protein nitrogen?

A Yes , if I know what the inconsistency is.

Q All right. Doctor, do you have an opinion as to whether
or not the decline shown there would be a result of excess urea
in the feed, if the feed consumed by the cows during that
month contained 350 pounds of a 32 percent concentrate that
contained 26. 8 percent protein equivalent derived from nonprotein nitrogen, consumed by the animal at the rate of 32
pounds per day?
A Is this being offered to the cows every day during that
period?

Q Well, no. With no acclimation but at the outset and
then inconsistent amounts from that time on?
A Yes. I have an opinion.

Q What is that opinion?
A I think it's very probable for this to have a toxic effect
on these cows and also reduce their milk production.
(Tr. 738-742; Ab. 106-107)
There was absolutely no evidence offered to support the hypothetical assumptions
suggested by counsel to the expert witness. No actual evidence was offered or
received as to weather conditions , sickness among the herd or hoof trimming.
Apart from the hypothetical assumptions which were presented to the jury,
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no evidence was before the jury as to the aforesaid matters. The most damning
evidence of the assumptions entertained by the expert witness , relating to alleg~
consumption of high protein and inconsistencies , was really set forth in the question by counsel (which in substance and effect constituted his "testimony"), and
was never tied to fact or eVidence.
Irreg]!larities Concerning Evidence Relating to Damages
Counsel for defendant prepared certain exhibits which were a composite
in summary form of several items , including matters allegedly compiled from
internal revenue records and other sources never offered or received in ev:idence.
These exhibits related fundamentally to damages:
Exhibit 146-D - "Cows Sold for Beef'' - Claimed damage of
$63,400.00
Exhibits 161-D and 162-D - "Reasons Cows Ate More Grain"
Claimed damage of $159 , 638. 00
Exhibit 163-D $98,600.00

11

60 Retarded Cows" - Claimed damage of

Exhibit 138-D - "Death Losses" - Claimed damage of
$33,812.00
Exhibit 139-D - "Milk Losses" - Claimed damage of
$136,330.55
All of the aforesaid exhibits were refused after substantial discussion before
the jury.

(Tr. 1153-1156; Ab. 186-187) The defendant Fitzgerald thereafter was

permitted to testify, holding in his hand each of the aforesaid exhibits, and read·
ing the materials verbatim into the record. As to the matter of cows allegedly
culled from the herd and sold for beef because of the mal effects of plaintiff's feed.
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M<. Blonqul" on "veral oe""'ions "tempted to h>troduce Exhibit 146-D. Tho
Court admonished that the defendant Fitzgerald should not read from the document:
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Blonquist, you are asking him
again now to read from this proposed exhibit.
MR. BLONQUIST: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The Court would not permit him to do that
because he is reading from a document that has been marked as
an exhibit which has not yet been received.
MR. BLONQUIST: Correct.
THE COURT: And at such time as it is received, the
exhibit will speak for itself and there's no need for this witness
to read that document to the Court.
(Tr. 1081; Ab. 156)
Objection was made that the exhibit was based in part upon records not in the
courtroom (Tr. 1083; Ab. 157), and after some discussion the court sustained
the objection. (Tr. 1084; Ab. 157) The matter was again argued later and the
objection again sustained. (Tr. 1153-1156; Ab. 186-187)
Notwithstanding the prior rulings, defendant was thereafter permitted
to take the refused exhibits and read them verbatim into the record. This was
done without further objection of counsel, on the supposition that all rights had
been reserved. Defendant Fitzgerald was permitted to take the documents and
"start at the front and go clear through." (Tr. 1158; Ab. 188) At first this recitalion by defendant appeared to be accomplished from memory, but a comparison of
the record to the refused exhibits makes it clear that the information from the
exhibits was read verbatim into the record. (Tr. 1042-1084; 1157-1167; Ab. 145147, 187-192) The court suggested a procedure to expedite testimony by requesting
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that defendant refer only to certain columns on Exhibit 146 (Tr. 1162-1163; Ab.
190), and with this apparent judicial sanction, counsel for defendant

acknowJedg~

that Fitzgerald had "just completed reading."
Similarly, other exhibits relating to defendant's damages were not only
summaries of DHIA records previously admitted into evidence and of defendant's
oral testimony, but also based upon alleged income tax returns (which were
repeatedly referred to, but never presented in court or admitted in evidence).
The court properly refused the proposed exhibits on the basis that such exhibits
were summaries of records not previously introduced into evidence. (Tr. 1156;
Ab. 187) For instance, as to Exhibit 139-D , Mr. Fitzgerald admitted that the deatn
losses being asserted had been set forth for tax purposes "in my tax folders theri.'
(Tr. 1051; Ab. 148) Those tax folders were never offered or admitted. In arrivilJi
at the values for alleged loss of milk production , Mr. Fitzgerald said:
. . . I have in my tax folders , a ticket from each month from
the company I sold my milk to, which gives the value they paid
me for the milk_for that-month.
Q And do you have those with you?
A Yes. There, in that whole bunch of brown envelopes
right in front of you.
MR. BLONQUIST:

(Indicating.)

MR. CONDIB: You're referring to Count Number Two

now?
MR. BLONQUIST: Count Number Four.
MR. CONDIB: Thank you.

-22-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE WITNESS: This is a ticket from Beatrice FoodsMeadow Gold Dairies which has so many pounds of milk at $9. 52
carton weight and that's a hundred pounds. I have one of these
for each of the months for every year I produced milk. (Indicating. )
MR. BLONQUIST: All right. The use of the DHI record on
those Beatrice Food stubs were then used by you in the preparation of the computation that you are about to give, is that correct?
A Th at' s correct.
(Tr. 1051; Ab. 148)
Relating the aforesaid to how he had computed his damages , Mr. Fitzgerald again
referred to the tickets, brown folders, and other records which were never introduced as being the basis for the alleged damages.
. . . After I had taken the number of cows times the loss per
day and got a total number of pounds lost that month; I took that
figure, times the figure off of these things you just referred to in
the tax notices that invoice slip of how much I got for milk for that
month, and I come up with a figure at the end of that of the total
loss in dollars per month that I had lost on milk losses for that
month. (Tr. 1052; Ab. 148)
The court reserved its ruling as to admissibility of each of the exhibits which had
been constructed from records above described, and finally rejected all of the
exhibits.

(Tr. 1156; Ab. 187)

Notwithstanding such background, defendant was thereafter permitted to
testify and read from each of the refused exhibits, and in closing argument, counsel
for the defendant referred to the pile of Beatrice Food tickets which were stacked
upon counsel table as evidence of defendant's damages. That all of this was confusing
to the jury is evident from the fact that during the deliberations the jury sent a
note to the judge requesting identification of the exhibit numbers which related
to the Beatrice Foods tickets and damages. Judge Hall communicated to the jury
that inbyfact
those
tickets
had never
introduced
asbyexhibits.
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Evidence of Calculation of Damages
Evidence presented relating to defendant's damages as set forth in his Co
claim is as follows:
COUNT I. "Cow Deaths." Defendant testified that 42 of his cows died
as a result of the consumption by those cows of feed negligently manufactured by
plaintiff, at a loss of $33 ,600. 00.

(Tr. 1042-1048; Ab. 145-147) Defendant deriv~

this figure by searching his memory and tax records which never were introduced
into evidence. (Tr. 1042-1049, 1149; Ab. 145-187) Thereafter, defendant admitt
that he did not have any records which would show the cause of death for the cows
he is claiming damages for.

(Tr. 1122-1131; Ab . 180 , 181) The DHIA records,

as admitted into evidence, indicate that twenty-two of defendant's cows died during
the periods of time in question. (Tr. 333; Ab. 22) The DHIA records do not
reflect the cause of death. Mr. Withers did, however, testify that under various
circumstances a cow could come into a herd and die prior to being included on
the DHIA records. (Tr. 356-361; Ab. 25-26) Defendant's hired milkers testified
as to even fewer cows that died of bloat. Mr. Aragon who worked for the defendant from May 1971 to July 1972 (Tr. 583; Ab. 63) and again from April 1973 to
October 20, 1973 (Tr. 594; Ab. 69) testified that he remembered three cows
having died from bloat during a bad onset of bloat, when 7 or 8 cows had bloated;
this was between May 1971 and July 1972 at American Fork.

(Tr. 610; Ab. 72)

Another milker, Dallas Schrimer, who worked for the defendant from September
1972 to August 1974 and from April 1975 to the present (Tr. 641; Ab. 81) testified

only as to two cows which died of bloat during his employ at defendant's dairy·
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(Tr. 661-663; Ab. 86) Likewise, Harvey Cook, who milked defendant's cows from
January 1, 1974, to the present (Tr. 679; Ab. 89) testified as having seen only
two cows in defendant's dairy herd die of bloat.

(Tr. 680; Ab. 90)

COUNT II. "Cows Sold for Beef because of Non-Productivity." The
defendant testified that it was necessary for him to "cull" 136 cows at a loss of
$63, 400. 00 because such cows were no longer productive. Approximately onehalf of the 136 cows sold for beef were so sold because they could not get pregnant.
The remaining cows were sold due to "stress" and ''bloat." (Tr. 1076-1080; Ab.
155-156; Tr. 1133-1142; Ab. 182-183; Tr. 1158-1167; Ab. 188-192) Defendant
expressly testified that the information which he compiled on proposed Exhibit
146, was taken from the DHIA records (Tr. 1133; Ab. 182) which indicated the cow
number, production level, and percentage of the herd. Defendant also stated that
he had no records which show why any particular cow was culled during the time
periods he used plaintiff's feed.

(Tr. 1140; Ab. 183) Thereafter defendant testified

that in listing the cows he sold for beef, he reviewed the DHIA records, his memory,
and "other sources which (he) deems to be reliable." (Tr. 1158; Ab. 188) The
DHIA records for the periods of time in question indicate that a total of only 87

cows were sold for beef. (Tr. 334; Ab. 22)
COUNT III. "60 Retarded Cows." Defendant testified that he incurred
damages of $98, 600. 00 due to the additional costs required to maintain his cows
beyond the normal lactation period. ln determining his measure of damages,
defendant multiplied the number of days beyond 305 days each cow was in lactation,
by $4.00 per day for the first period of his feeding plaintiff's feed and $5.10 per
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,
day for the second period of his feeding plaintiff's feed. Defendant stated that
the daily values represented his cost of labor, feed, housing, utilities, etc.

(Tr, .

1065-1069; Ab. 152-153; Tr. 1074-1076; Ab. 154-155; Tr. 1157-1158; Ab. 188)

Mr. Gerald Withers, defendant's witness, testified that a lactation period is based
on 305 days, although, it is not unusual for a cow to milk more or less than 305
days.

(Tr. 302; Ab. 17) Defendant, however, claiming that his cows could not

get pregnant because of plaintiff's feed, computed his damages on a per day main1
ance charge for each day in lactation over 305 days.

In addition, defendant's wiln

Dr. Gardner, testified that there is conflict of opinion among leading authorities
on the subject as to whether urea (NPN) has any relationship whatsoever to the
reproductive process, calving, retained placentas and natural abortions. (Tr.
735; Ab. 104-105)

COUNT IV. "Stomach Upset and Stress Resulting in a Decline in Milli
Production." Defendant claims that as a result of feeding plaintiff's grain to his
dairy herd, the cows suffered stomach upset and stress, causing a

d~cline

in

milk production and damages in the amount of $124,053.00. There was testimony
by expert witnesses Gardner (Tr. 714-715; Ab. 100) and Huber (Tr. 862; Ab.
198) that under test conditions if a cow consumed . 4 pounds of urea per day, such

amount of-urea would be sufficient to cause a decline in milk production. Both
Drs. Gardner and Huber testified that none of the State Chemist reports on 14%
dairy feed contained a sufficient amount of urea to cause the problems in declining
milk production defendant complained of.

(Tr. 795; Ab. 121; Tr. 877; Ab. 202)

Defendant states that he used a chart (Exhibit 136) and the DHIA records to determ·
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his milk production losses per month and then he multipled the total number of
pounds of milk lost per month by invoice figures, such as the Beatrice Foods-Meadow
Gold Dairy receipt, which he claims he maintained for his tax records, to determine
the value of his claimed loss of milk production. The tax receipts and invoice-receipts
were never introduced into evidence. In addition, the poundage figures as to defendant's
claimed loss of milk production are unsupported.
COUNT V. "Increased Costs to Maintain Production Level." Defendant
testified that he incurred additional expenses as a result of the consumption of
plaintiff's feed in the amount of $20 ,000 .00. He testified that his c).ajmed damages
included the increased costs of milking three times a day, extra labor costs, the
cost of extra utility use, such as gas and electricity , the costs of additional wear
and tear on machinery, the cost of bloat guard, and the cost of artificial insemination. (Tr. 1061-1062; Ab. 151; Tr. 1109-1110; Ab. 163-164; Tr. 1168-1169; Ab.
192-193) No receipts, invoices, cancelled checks, business records, utility bills,
etc. were introduced into evidence to support his claim for $20 ,000 .00 in increased
costs and expenses incurred as a result of feeding plaintifrs grain. A large part
of defendant's claimed damages with respect to converting to three-times milking
was based upon percentages in an article he had read in a Dairy Herd Management
magazine.

(Tr. 1062; Ab. 151) The Dairy Herd Management magazine article

which defendant relied upon was not offered into evidence.
COUNT VI. "Cows Ate More Grain." Defendant claims that his dairy
herd consumed a greater volume of feed to compensate for the protein deficiency
of plaintiff, resulting in $64 ,000 .00 of damages. Defendant testified that he was
feeding his cows additional grain in an attempt to increase their production, but
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that because the cows were sick, they could not utilize the grain they ate and th~
milk production was lower.

(Tr. 1103; Ab. 162) In calculating his damages,d•

testified that the United States Department of Agriculture publishes a ratio of the
pounds of milk produced per pounds of grain consumed. During the periods of
time in question, one pound of grain was necessary for a cow to produce three
pounds of milk according to the ratio published by the U. S . Department of Agriculture. No evidence of such published ratio was offered at trial. Defendant
determined that, on the average, each cow in his herd consumed 26 pounds of
grain per day by averaging the number of pounds of grain he ordered from plain·

and dividing that amount by the number of cow days.

(Tr. 1111; Ab. 164) Defen·

dant admitted that the 26 pounds of grain consumed per cow "on the average" w~
calculated only with respect to a three month period during which defendantpur·
280 tons of grain, not with respect to the total time that he was purchasing plaintiff
feed. The consumption of grain by dry cows , calves and springing heifers is not
included in the calculation of the 26 pound average figure. Defendant admits
the average would be lower if such grain consuming cows were included in his
computations.

(Tr. 1152; Ab. 186) Futher it must be noted that there is controv

as to how many pounds of grain defendant's cows consumed daily. The consumptii
of grain varied anywhere from 5 to 32 pounds of grain per cow per day. (Tr.
1152; Ab. 186)

Defendant determined the amount of grain per day necessary to

support his actual milk production using the 26 pounds figure (Tr. 1111; Ab. !6ll
and computed his damages therefrom .
COUNT VII. "Overpayment to Plaintiff due to Protein Deficiency in
Feed." Defendant claims $57 ,420 .00 in damages due to an overpayment for feed
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deficient in crude protein. In calculating his damages, defendant averaged the
crude protein content reflected on the State Chemist reports on 32% cattle supplement and 32% concentrate from 19 70-1975. Upon determining a percentage deficiency
in protein, defendant multiplied that figure by the cost of protein per ton, and

then arrived at a figure which he considers to be an overpayment to IFA because
of a protein deficiency.

(Tr. 1093-1102; Ab. 160-162) Thereafter, defendant

admitted that in averaging the claimed deficiency in crude protein he did not offset
excesses of protein against deficiencies nor did he average out the protein content
of 14% dairy feed, during the time period in question, which is the type of feed
purchased by defendant.

(Tr. 1152; Ab. 186)

LEGAL ARGUMENT
POINT I.
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY AND RECEIPT OF EVIDENCE
RELATING SOLELY TO THE ISSUE OF ALLEGED PUNITIVE
DAMAGES RESULTED IN CONFUSION TO THE JtJRY
AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR
Evidence which admittedly could not be used to show contamination of the feed
purchased by defendant Fitzgerald bearing upon the seven substantive Counts of
the Counterclaim was admitted time and time again over objection of counsel. On
several occasions, counsel for defendant Fitzgerald stressed in front of the jury
the relevance of such evidence as bearing solely upon the issue of punitive damages
in connection with notice and knowledge.

(Tr. 502; Ab. 57: Tr. 817; Ab. 126)

The court apparently acquiesced in the limitations asserted by counsel for Fitzgerald,
but in many instances that was not clear and many of the exhibits in dispute were
admitted into evidence generally.

l

(See Tr. 270: Ab. 12; Tr. 710, 711: Ab. 99.)
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The adverse cumulative effect of such evidence undoubtedly was very damaging.
The jury refused to return a verdict on punitive damages , but assessed enormoU!
general damages. The admission of particular exhibits months before and montJu
the relevant time period, and concerning feed sold at other places, undoubtedly
contributed to the large jury award. Examples of "tainted" exhibits which well
could have unduly influenced the jury, all well beyond the time period and cone·
relevant, if at all, only to punitive damages, are Exhibits 12-D, 13-D, 15-D, and
149-D. One of the test reports within Exhibit 149-D on a small sample of 32% Daiey
Concentrate pellets taken at St. George on May 4, 1970, reads that:

"This label

is false and misleading." It was never made clear to the jury as to that sample,
or any of the aforesaid exhibits, that such could not be considered in mBking de!
ations of negligence, proximate cause, or assessment of damages other than puni ·
(See pp. 9-12 of this Brief, supra.)
The court recognized at the conclusion of the trial upon submission of the
case to the jury that some of the exhibits could be confusing to the jury. In this
regard, Judge Hall acknowledged that the jury ought not to be allowed to specuhi
or give weight to certain exhibits on the issues of excess urea, inconsistent protein, deficiency in crude protein , negligence or otherwise than specifically as
related to the question of notice and punitive damages , and gave the following
instruction:
You are instructed that certain exhibits hereinafter
enumerated have been offered and admitted iiito evidence by
the court as bearing' Upon the question ofnotfoe to the plaintiff
of a deficiency in its feed. You are instructed that said exhibits
should not be considered for any other purpose or as bearing
upon any other issue and do not constitute proof of any other
claim made by the counterclaimant in this case. (Instruction
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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r
The court failed thereafter to enumerate the exhibits so restricted. (See pp. 1112 of this Brief, supra )
The aforesaid instruction could only have contributed more to the confusion
of the jury. It was an insufficient curative instruction and could not have helped
the jury to identify which exhibits they were being told not to consider as proof
of other than punitive damages .
A. The Admission of Exhibits Remote in Time and Place was
Error Because of the Risk of Confusion
In Rule 6 of our Rules of Evidence, it is recognized that evidence may be

admitted for one purpose only , but that the court has a duty to restrict such evidence
to its proper scope and to instruct the jury accordingly. In this ~ed, it ts Bornbook
law that evidence incompetent for one purpose may be proper for another purpose.
(19 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence,

§

262) However, since the jury may erroneously use

evidence proper for only a restricted purpose for other purposes, it is error to
receive such in the first place if the risk of confusion is so great "as to upset the
balance of advantage of receiving it." (Id.) This proposition, th4t initial receipt
of such evidence may constitute error as a matter of law where the circumstances
of confusion are probable, has been recognized by many courts, including the

Supreme Court of the United States. Thus, in Waldron v. Waldron, 156 US 311
(1894), the Court stated:
There is an exception, however, to this general rule,
by virtue of which the curative effect of the correction, in
any particular instance, depends upon whether or not,
considering the whole case in its particular circumstances,
the error committed appears to have been of so serious a
nature that it must have affected the minds of the jury
despite the correction by the Court. (Id. at 383) [Emphasis
added.]
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Accord, Shepard v. USA, 290 US 96 (1933) , where in a criminal case, but With
equal applicability to civil cases, the Court said:
It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoanalysts,
that our rules of evidence are framed. . . . When the risk
of confusion is so great as to upset the balance of advantage,
the evidence goes out. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Ev.
266, 516: Wignore, Ev. Sections 1421, 1422, 1714. (290 US at
104) [Emphasis added.]
B. Failure to Instruct with Clarity as to the Restricted Use Constituted
Prejudicial Error
This Court has long recognized the danger inherent in receipt of evidence
which was admissible only for a special purpose, and early adopted the universally followed rule:
· When evidence is introduced which is not admissible
except for a special purpose, the jury should be instructed
upon the request of the party prejudiced thereby, to limit its
use to that purpose only; and a refusal to so instruct upon
request is reversible error, when the evidence, if not explained,
is such as might be misapplied so as to exercise an improper
influence upon the jury in respect to the main issue to the
injury of the party against whom the evidence was adduced.
Neilson v. Nebo Brown Stone Co., 25 Utah 37, 69 Pac. 289
(1902).
This is a well settled rule in both civil and criminal cases. Where, as in this
case, objection was made to receipt of the challenged exhibits, the court has a
duty to issue proper instructions limiting the use of the evidence in question to
proper issues:
Evidence which is incompetent as to one issue, but admissible as to another, cannot properly be considered for its bearing
on the former issue. Such evidence should be offered by a party
and received by the court ONLY for the specific purpose for which
it is competent. The court should limit its application by proper
instructions at least where requested to do so or when objection
is made to the introduction of evidence. 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence,
§ 263 at 311. [Emphasis added.]
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But the damning effect of the situation in the case at bar is even worse and
stronger than in the cited authorities . Here, the court recognized the necessity
for a curative instruction, and undertook to set forth an admonition to the jury in
order to guide it in Instruction 20 and to require exclusion of "certain exhibits"
from consideration "for any other purpose" than the question of notice per the
punitive damage issue. But this Instruction did not help . It further confused.
What exhibits were so excluded? Even if the jury could recall the maze of testimony
over the nine day trial, the circumstances as to how the prejudicial exhibits were
received into evidence, after objection, only would have added to the confusion. 3>
3) Previous admission of remote exhibits into evidence, often withaut admonition
at the time of receipt into evidence as to the purpose received, had to be confusing. For instance, some of the most objectionable exhibits were introduced, objected
to, and received generally. (See Exhibits 4-D, 5-D, 11-D, 12-D .) Others were
introduced, objected to, ruling reserved and later admitted into evidence generally.
[Exhibits 13-D, 14-D, 15-D, 16-D, 89-D, 90-D, .92-D, 94-D, 95-D, 99-D, 100-D,
104-D, 110-D, 111-D, 112-D, 113-D, 114-D, 115-D, 125-D, 126-D, 127-D, 128-D
(test numbers 6263 and 4090), 129-D (test numbers 9066·, 2779, 2746, 4804) and
130-D (test numbers 3333,5204, 5624, 5722, 6722, 9061, 75-2833 and 75-3670).)
In other instances, objectionable exhibits bearing conceivably only upon punitive damages were introduced, objected to, ruling reserved, admitted into evidence,
and later in discussion or in connection with testimony of some other witness,
restricted to the issue of notice or knowledge. The court ultimately sustained objection
as to general use of Exhibit 12-D. (Tr. 710, 711; Ab. 99) A similar restriction
was also placed on Exlu'bit 15. (Tr. 704, 711; Ab. 98, 99) In discussions before
the jury during the offering of remote exhibits, after objection by counsel for plaintiff,
defendant's counsel expressly stated that such exhibits were offered for the sole
purpose of showing notice or knowledge as it relates to the punitive element of
defendant's claim. [See Exhibits 2 through 16 at Tr. 271; Ab. 12; Exhibits 89
through 130 at Tr. 502, 504; Ab. 57; and Exhibit 149-D at Tr. 817; Ab. 126]
(See pp. 6-12 of this Brief, supra.)

-33-
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POINT II.
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY ON THE ISSUE OF
NEGLIGENCE CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
This case was pleaded and evidence presented solely on the theory of aI!eg~
negligence. The Amended Counterclaim set forth seven counts of negligence,

eact

claiming damages "as a direct, legal and proximate result" of "feed negligently
produced." Count VIII also repeated the allegations of negligence, but was for
punitive damages because of alleged "willful and intentional" conduct of selling
feed after being informed that the label was "false and misleading." At the conclu·
sion of the case in chief, in argument in response to Motion for Directed Verdict,
counsel for defendant made it abundantly clear that the sole theory of recovery
was negligence, and that the relevant considerations were (1) negligence,

(2)

causation, and (3) damages. (Tr. 840-851; Ab. 173-178) However, in submissioo
of the case to the jury, in the Special Interrogatories and the Special Verdict and
in instructions , there was an apparent switch in that the jury was asked to deter·
mine (as the sole basis for any possible liability) whether the feed delivered by
plaintiff "contained levels of urea and protein inconsistent with its guarantee."
(R. 140) Then, as though the case were based upon warranty or some theory

of absolute liability, the court instructed that if the jury were to determine from
a preponderance of the evidence (keep in mind that there was no direct evidence
and that such preponderance had to be based upon an inference both as to negli·
gence and causation from the circumstances - see Point III. A, at pp.39-40 of this
Brief, infra) that the feed in question was manufactured in violation of the statute,
there was negligence per seas a matter of law.

(See the Court's Instructions

16 and 17 at pp. 12-13, of this Brief, supra.)
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A. Submission of the Case to the Jury on the Theory of Guarantee
Was Confusing and Constituted Error
This court has recognized the applicable general rule that submission of
the case to the jury must be confined to the issues pleaded and the evidence
presented:
Instructions should be confined to the issues presented
by the pleadings and the evidence. It is improper to give an
instruction announcing a naked legal proposition, however
correct it may be, unless it bears upon and is connected with
the issues involved; and unless , further, there has been received
some competent evidence to which the jury may apply it. Such
an instruction tends to distract the minds of the jury from the
real question submitted to them for determination. . . .
In determining the scope of its instructions, the court
must keep in mind the issues made by the pleadings in the
cause; and the general rule is that all instructions must be
confined to those issues , and the evidence in support thereof,
and that no instruction should be given which tenders an issue
that is not supported by the pleadings or which deviates therefrom in any material respect. Davis v. Midvale City, 56 Utah
1, 189 Pac. 74 (1920).
Plainly, the guarantee and strict liability theories set forthin the Instructions and
Special Interrogatories were not the theories on which defendant pleaded his cause
of action or presented evidence.
B. Violation of Statute does not Necessarily Constitute Negligence
Per Se and May be Considered Only as Evidence of Negligence
As Instructions 16 and 17 were given, the question of negligence was virtually taken away from consideration by the jury, and it was instructed as a matter
of law to find negligence to exist if they were to determine that the statutes in
question were violated in any particular. This court has limited the effect of statutory
violation in negligence cases to very narrow circumstances, and has stressed that
while violation of a statute may be prima facie evidence of negligence, such does
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not constitute negligence as a matter of law. Determination of negligence is a
question of fact, not law. In Thompson v. Ford Motor Co. , 16 Utah 2d 30, 39~
P . 2d 62 (1964) , this court noted that violation of a safety standard set by statute
or ordinance may be regarded as prima facie evidence of negligence , but is
subject to justification or excuse if the evidence is such that it reasonab_!r
could be found that the conduct was nevertheless within the standard of care
the circumstances. In an early case, the Supreme Court of Utah noted that when
a statute is violated the effect thereof in terms of negligence presents a question
of fact:
Whether to do so (violate a statute) constitutes negligence
is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the case and
generally, is a question of fact, not law. White v. Shipley,

48 Utah 496, 160 Pac 441 (1916) at 444. [Emphasis added.]
To the same effect is Klafta v. Smith, 17 Utah 2d 65, 404 P .2d 659 (1965). In thi
case, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling that the defendli
was liable as a matter of law for the violation of a statute which required loaded
vehicles to be securely fastened so that the cargo would not fall on the highway.
In Klafta, this Court expressly held that the alleged violation of that statute
did not constitute liability as a matter of law, and reiterated the principle that
violation of a statute is at most prima facie evidence of negligence subject tojus'
tion or excuse.
The farreaching and prejudicial effect of Instructions 16 and 17 (as to whid
strenuous exception was taken) cannot be overestimated. To begin with, in
order to find violation of the statutes relating to misbranding, the jury would haVI
had to infer from questionable (incompetent?) circumstantial evidence that the
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feed actually delivered or sold to Fitzgerald was contaminated, by reason oflligredients presumably mixed after shipment from a branch of plaintiff other than Spanish
Fork. There is serious question as to the legal sufficiency of such evidence as
a matter of law in any event. (See pp. 40 of this Brief, infra.) But arguendo,
if it was proper to permit the jury to infer or speculate as to the toxicity of the

specific or actual feed which was eaten by Mr. Fitzgerald's cows, was it proper
to

~the

jury to find negligence to exist as a matter of law if there was a violation

of the statute in any particular at any time relating to the feed in question or any
component ingredient thereof? Jury Instructions Nos. 16 and 17 effeetively took
consideration as to the standard of care away from the jury and set Ult the statutes
as the sole measure of the standard of care and of negligence. Ol!ller''than pessible

4
violation of the statutes , > many other considerations were before tbe jury whieh
could have preponderated against a determination of negligence if the jury had
been allowed to weigh and consider all relevant evidence. 5>
4) Note that there was never presented any direct evidence that the statutes were
ever violated during the time periods in question. The jury would have had to
infer violation. Several exhibits which were remote in time (such ae exln'bits
12-D, 13-D, 15-D and 149-D) were the most likely source of such an inference.
But those exhibits were (or should have been) confined to punitive damages. By
Instructions 16 and 17 the Court invited the jury to look at ~ admitted evidence
(including evidence which had been limited solely to punitive damages) in determining the possible violation of the statutes. Such <n'lStituted prejudicial error
in that the jury was directed to look at "tainted" exhibits admittedly not bearing
upon the issue of negligence.
5) The jury had before it much evidence from which a determination against the
existence of negligence, based upon a preponderance thereof, could have been
made if the issue of negligence hadn't been removed as a matter of law. For
instance, the jury should have been allowed to weigh and consider the following
matters in determining whether IFA's acts and conduct fell below the proper
standard of care:
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It is submitted that Instructions 16 and 17 invaded the province of the jury

and in effect erroneously misconceived the case as one of warranty or absolute
liability for statutory violations .

. Of the 77 State Chemist Reports admitted into evidence, 35 were
of feed samples taken during the relevant time periods , and only two indi·
cated a presence of excess urea (NPN) . (Six test reports indicated an e
of urea (NPN) in the 42 samples before and after the relevant time periods.]
Accordingly, there was much more affirmative evidence of properly manufactured feed than of possible contamination. (See also footnotes 1and2
at pp. 5-6 of this Brief; supra . )
. Blair Thomas testified that he purchased 14% dairy feed from
plaintiff's Spanish Fork branch during the same time periods that defendant was using IFA feed, without any of the symptoms complained of by
defendant appearing in his dairy herd. (Tr. 920-922; Ab. 214-215)
. Ferris Fitzgerald testified that he fed each of his cows approximately . 7 pounds of urea per day, without any of the symptoms complained
of by defendant. (Tr. 778, 796; Ab. 117, 121) Defendant's cows would
not have consumed that much urea per day even if they ate only the feed
reflected on the State Chemist Reports showing the greatest urea concentr ·
. Exhibits 58-P - 63-P indicate that during the time period that del
was feeding his cows plaintiff's feed, the yearly milk production of his dail!
herd increased from 12,584 pounds of milk per cow (372 pounds of milk pa
cow less than the Salt Lake County average) to 14, 675 pounds of milk per
cow (1,688 pounds of milk per coW' ~than the Salt Lake County
average).

-38-
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POINT III.
EVIDENCE OFFERED AND RECEIVED WAS INSUFFICIENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW TO PROVE THAT PLAINTIFF'S
NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED DEFENDANTCOUNTERCLAIMANT'S DAMAGES
Defendant had the burden to show from a preponderance of evidence (1) that
plaintiff manufactured and sold to defendant feed which was harmful and defective,
in that it contained an excess of urea, a deficiency in crude protein, or inconsistent

protein levels contrary to the general duty owed by plaintiff to all dairymen who
purchased its feed, to sell feed which would not harm dairy animals; (2) that there
was a causal connection between the alleged harmful feed and the deaths, sickness

and loss of production among defendant's dairy herd; and (3) that defendant
suffered damages as a result of feeding his cows such harmful and defective feed,
and the amount of such damages. Each of the foregoing elements must be established
by prima facie evidence before the case could be submitted for jury consideration.

But defendant's case was built entirely upon circumstantial evidence in order to
create inferences. Circumstantial evidence presented was relied upon not only
to create the inference of negligence but also to create the inference of causation.
It is submitted that as to each element there was an insufficiency of proof as

a matter of law .
A. Plaintiff's Motion for Directed Verdict Should Have Been Granted as a
Matter of Law

1i

At the conclusion of defendant's evidence on the Counterclaim, plaintiff moved
for a directed verdict. (Tr. 829; Ab. 165) This matter was extensively argued.
(Tr. 829-850; Ab . 165-178) It is subnrltted that at the time this motion was filed ,

i

II

I

iIi

the evidence before the jury of negligence, proximate cause and damages was
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clearly insufficient as a matter of law. The trial court was inclined to grant themQ

and commented as to the non-existence of clinical tests relating to the feed in question. (Tr. 840, 850; Ab. 78) The matter was thereafter argued upon the basis of
two Utah cases thought by the court to be controlling and the motion was denied.
The cases in question were Farmers Grain Coop. v. Fredrickson, 7 Utah 2d 180,
321 P .2d 926 (1958) and Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 241P.2d914
(1952). It is submitted that the court misapplied those cases to the facts of this
case, and erred in failing to distinguish those cases and regarding them as controlling. Those cases , and other relevant authorities , are discussed in detail in
connection with Point III. D of this Brief concerning insufficiency of evidence as
relating to proximate cause.
As to law supporting the proposition that the motion for directed verdict
should have been granted, this Court has recqplized that a directed verdict is p
where the proof fails to disclose any controversy as to controlling facts or where
is a lack of proof supporting one or more of the material elements of the cause o!
action asserted. Flynn v. W. P. Harlin Construction Co., 29 Utah 2d 317, 509
p .2d 356 (1973).

B. Insufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence to Create Inference ofNegligen
It is submitted that the evidence presented as to the non-punitive counts

bearing upon negligence was insufficient as a matter of law to create the inferen~
of negligence. 6 ) Arguendo, however, that the jury could have inferred negligeni

6) Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence with respect to
plaintiff's breach of duty in the following particulars:
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1. No direct evidence was introduced to show that the IFA 14% dairy feed
consumed by defendant's cows, contained an excess of urea (NPN), a deficiency
of protein or an inconsistency in the amounts of protein. In fact both expert witnesses Drs. Gardner and Huber stated that none of the feed analyzed in the State
Chemist Reports on 14% dairy feed during the time periods in question would cause
the type of problems complainedofby defendant. (Tr. 795; Ab. 121; Tr. 877;
Ab. 202)

2. If the State Chemist Reports prior and subsequent to the pertinent time
periods in question were admitted solely for the purpose of notice as related to
Count VIII on punitive damages, such reports could not have been considered for
establishing a prima facie case of negligence as to Counts I through VII. Such
remote exhibits cannot be used to infer that the feed that defendant's cows ate
was necessarily defective, harmful, or substandard merely because, at various
points in time before and after defendant used plaintiff's feed, the State Chemical
Reports indicated that there were feed samples taken from branch offices of IFA
other than Spanish Fork which differed from the contents of the feed as set forth
on the label and that plaintiff had notice thereof.
3. Disregarding all remote State Chemist Reports, only two such reports
(Exhibits 116-D and 130-D, test number 9870), show excessive amounts of urea
(NPN) sufficient to cause the problems complained of only if certain assumptions
are made relative to the weight of the cow, the amount of grain consumed, the
lack of intake of other food matter, the absence of an acclimation period, the use
of 350 pounds of the 32% supplement per ton of 14% dairy feed, and the absence
of such factors as seasonal changes , disease among the herd , hoof trimming, and
a variety of other possible causes of the problems complained of by defendant.
(Tr. 707, 736, 751, 902; Ab. 98-105, 110, 209) Furthermore, those two State Chemist
Reports cover only a very limited time period, in comparison to the nearly th;ree
-year period during which defendant fed IFA feed to his cows. Exhibit 130-D (test
number 9870) is a sample of 32% dairy concentrate taken at the St. George branch
of IFA a few days after defendant began using plaintiff's feed and Exhibit 116-D
is a sample of 32% cattle supplement taken at the Draper branch of IFA one day
before defendant quit feeding IFA feed. There is no evidence that this 32% ingredient
was mixed with 14% dairy feed that defendant's cows ate, and that even if it was
mixed into 14% dairy feed, there is no evidence that such 32% supplement was so
mixed into the feed defendant purchased throughout the entire period of time in
question. In addition, there is testimony that an excess in urea (NPN) in the supplement does not necessarily follow through into the 14% dairy feed when mixed.
(See Tr. 797-798; Ab. 122 and see Exhibits 99-D and 100-D, 101-D and 103-D,
and 112-D and 124-D .)
4. Defendant asserted that the test reports from the State Chemist's Office
plainly show that IFA was negligent, that IFA breached its statutory duty under
the Commercial Feed Laws, and therefore breached its duty owed to defendant,
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from all of the evidence (as distiguished from being directed to find negligence
as a matter of law - see Point II. of this Brief, supra), it is submitted that the ju~
could not legally infer from that same evidence the existence of proximate cause.
In substance and effect, this amounts to bulding an inference upon an inference.
C. Inference Based Upon Inference
An inference which is based solely and entirely upon another inference ana
which is unsupported by any additional fact or any other inference from other faa;
is an inference upon an inference and is universally condemned. Generally, whi
is meant by the rule forbidding the basing of one inference upon another is that~
inference cannot be based upon evidence which is too uncertain or speculative or
which raises merely a conjecture or possibility.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the basic principle that an inference
cannot be based upon an inference as early as 1916 in Denver

&

R .G .R. Co. v.

Ashton-Whyte-Skillicorn Co., 49 Utah 82, 162 Pac. 83 (1916), wherein this Court
held:
As the record now stands, however, the presumption of defendant's negligence must be based upon another presumption, namely
that the cars were in the actual control and management of the
defendant when they escaped. This would result in basing one
presumption upon another which would be violation of an elementary
rule of evidence. Id . at 85 .
The rule is well stated in Splinter v. City of Nampa, 74 Idaho 1, 10, 256 P .2d
215' 220 (1953):

as anindividualpurchaserofitsfeed. (Tr. 843-846; Ab. 173-175) The State
Chemist Reports outside of the pertinent time periods were introduced solely '.01
purpose of notice; if such notice was in fact established , such notice, alone• is
insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish a probability of negligence with resp
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r
Circumstantial evidence is competent to establish negligence
and proximate cause. Facts, which are essential to a liability for
negligence, may be inferred upon circumstances which are established by evidence. But, where circumstantial evidence is relied
upon, the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves be
left to presumption or inference. (Citations.) This court has
held that inference cannot be based upon inference, nor presumption on presumption. (Citations . )
The underlying principle applicable here is that a verdict
cannot rest on conjecture; that where a party seeks to establish
a liability by circumstantial evidence, he must establish circumstances of such nature and so related to each other that his theory
of liability is the more reasonable conclusion to be drawn therefrom, and that where the proven facts are equally consistent with
the absence, as with the existence, of negligence on the part of
defendant, the plaintiff has not carried the burden of proof and
cannot recover. (Citations.) [Emphasis added.]
See also: Annot., 95 A .L .R. 162, 181-192 (1935); Wigmore on
Evidence, Third Ed. Vol. IX, at 299 (1940).
The following principles are pertinent in applying the prohibition of inference upon
inference in this case:
Inference Must be Reasonably Certain and ProbableA presumption of fact or inference cannot be raised f~m some proven fact
unless a rational connection exists between such fact and the ultimate fact presumed.
A fact can be regarded as the basis of an inference only where the inference logically

flows from the fact. An inference must reasonably be drawn from and supported by
the facts on which it purports to rest, and must be made in accordance with correct
and common modes of reasoning. Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Co. , 4 Utah 2d

303, 193P.2d 700 (1956). ~·Schmidt v. Pioneer United Dairy, 60Wash
2d271, 373P.2d 764 (1962); Downs v. Longfellow Corp., 351P.2d 999 (Okla.
1960).
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Premises for Inference Must be Based upon Fact
A presumption or inference of fact must not be drawn from premises

Whi~

are uncertain, but must be founded on facts established by direct evidence.
In this respect, this Court recently held in Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 27 u
2d 419, 497 P .2d 28 (1972) that:
(A) f"mding of causation cannot be predicated on mere
speculation or conjecture, and the matter must be withdrawn
from the jury's consideration, unless there is evidence from
which the inference may reasonably be drawn that the injury
suffered was caused by the negligent act of the defendant.
[Milligan v. Capitol Furniture Co. , 8 Utah 2d 383, 387, 335
P .2d 619 (1959).] Jurors may not speculate as to possibilities;
they may, however, make justifiable inferences from circumstantial
evidence to find negligence or proximate cause. In such instances,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of negligence, if men of reasonable minds may conclude
that there is a greater probability that the conduct relied upon
was the proximate cause than there is that it was not. [Alvarado
v. Tucker, 2Utah2d 16, 19, 268P.2d968 (1954).]
In the instant action, there was a mere choice of probabilities as to why Mr. Lewis was in the wrong lane of traffic,
and there was no basis in the evidence upon which the jury could
believe that there was a greater probability he was misled into
the opposing lane rather than for some other reason. 497 P .2d at
31. [Emphasis added.]

Inference Cannot be Inconsistent with Direct and Uncontroverted Contr
Evidence
A fact cannot be established by circumstances which are perfectly consisl
with direct, uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony that the fact does note"
Bulatao v. Kauai Motors, Ltd., 49 Haw. 1, "406 P. 2d 887 (1965).
Circumstances Must be More than Merely Consistent
A fact is not proven by circumstances which are merely consistent with i~
existence. Arterburn v. St. Joseph's Hospital and Rehabilitation Center, 55!
P.2d 886 (Kan. 1976); Bottjer v. Hammond, 200 Kan. 327, 436 P.2d 882 (1968).
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r
D. Insufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence to Create Inference of
Proximate Cause
In this case, it was essential for the defendant to rule out other possible
causes of the damages before the jury should be allowed to infer (speculate?)
that the feed (which the jury had already been instructed was negligently manufactured, was toxic or would cause a decline in milk production if the jury should
find or infer violation of statutes in any particular) was the cause of the damage.
There had to be ruled out other possible causes, such as: weather; contamination
of other feed and food being eaten by the animals; ineffective and inefficient milking
techniques and milkers; inconsistent feeding and milking procedures; communicable disease among the herd; changing locations of the herd; and general poor
health among the herd. (See pp. 13-16 of this Brief, supra.) There was absolutely
no evidence presented to negate weather conditions, milking procedures, hoof
trimming, or sickness and disease among the herd as causes of the damage. As
a matter of fact, in apparent substitution for competent ·evidence, counsel for
defendant only proferred hypothetical questions and assumptions set forth in those
questions as the basis for supposedly negating hoof trimming, milking techniques
and procedures , weather conditions and seasonal changes, and sickness. The
only "evidence," which surely

was~

competent evidence, as to those matters

is fully set forth at pp. 16-20 of this Brief, supra.
Furthermore, there was no certain evidence that, even if plaintiff's feed was
somehow determined to be defective, the consumption of that feed would cause
the problems complained of, unless the jury was further to assume that the cows
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each weighed 1300 pounds, each ate 32 pounds of grain per day, that the cows
ate nothing else, and that all of the 14% dairy feed that they consumed during the
entire time period in question was manufactured using 350 pounds of that specifii
32% supplement reflected on Exhibits 116-D or 130-D (test number 9870). (Tr.
707, 736, 751, 901; Ab. 98, 105, 110, 209)

[Those were the only test reports

from which the jury could have inferred that toxic components were mi:ll!d into
the actual feed purchased.]

Moreover, even if the jury did make the above as

it would then have had to assume that the weather conditions were normal, that
there was no sickness among the herd, that the cows never had their hooves t ·
too closely, that the cows did not eat anything other than the 14% dairy feed, and
that all feedings and milkings were uniformly conducted each day over the enti11
period of time in question by the same milker. (Tr. 738-742; Ab. 106-107; Tr.
788; Ab. 106; Tr. 569, 470; Ab. 65; Tr. 585; Ab. 68; and Tr. 884; Ab. 204)
(See also pp. 16ofthis Brief, supra.)
Uncertain and speculative testimony plainly cannot be the basis for so essa
tial a determination as causation. Defendant is bound to remove the issue of pro·
cause from the realm of speculation by establishing facts affording a logical basis
for the inference which he claims. It is submitted that in this case the evidence
presented failed to meet this standard required to submit the matter to the jury.
(57 Am. Jur. 2d, Negligence,

§

141) Consideration of relevant Utah cases demon·

strates this pr.inciple, and show distinctions which place the case at bar outside
,the parameter of permissible inference for establishment of proximate cause by
circumstantial evidence.
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In Utah Cooperative Association v. Egbert-Haderlie Hog Farms, Inc. ,
550 P .2d 196 (Utah 1976), a suit was brought on an open account to recover for
the sale of livestock feed whereupon the buyer counterclaimed alleging that the
feed was contaminated. This Court noted that the feed supplied to defendant was
off-color and malodorous, unlike previous food shipments; that a chemical analysis
of the food samples taken from defendant's "weather tight" feed bins showed a presence
of salmonella; and that defendant's veterinarian diagnosed salmonella poisoning
of his hogs. Based upon such direct foundational evidence, the court held that
sufficient evidence had been presented from which a jury could reasonably find
that the contamination was a direct result of plaintiff's preparation of the feed,
and that contamination resulted from the processing. In so holding, the Utah Supreme
Court reversed the lower court's directed verdict in favor of the seller of the feed
and noted:
It is not necessary that the defendant show absolute
certainty that the source of infection among the hogs arose
from the ingredients supplied by the plaintiff, but it is sufficient if there is substantial evidence to support the likelihood
that the infection came from that source. Id. at 198 [Emphasis
added.]
Unlike the Utah Coop case, where the feed defendant actilally purchased

was found to contain salmonella, no direct evidence was introduced in this case
regarding a deficiency in crude protein or excess in urea in the actual IFA feed
defendant purchased. Furthermore, in the case at bar no professional diagnosis
was made as to the problems with Fitzgerald's herd or as to cause of such problems.
Based on the standards set forth in Utah Coop, the evidence presented in the case
at bar was insufficient to support the likelihood that defendant's claimed problems
were linked
toQuinney
the lntermountain
Farmers
feed. provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Likewise, this Court in Farmers Grain Coop. v. Fredrickson, 7 Utah 2a
180, 321 P .2d 926 (1958) held that the evidence was sufficient to justify an inle
that the feed in question was deficient and that such deficiency proximately ca
the grower's damage. In that case, the grain cooperative sued to

foreclos~

an

and mortgage executed by a turkey grower, who in turn counterclaimed for b
of warranty and negligence claiming nutritional deficiency in the feed sold to h'
by the cooperative. But in the Farmers Grain case, there was careful elirnina'
of all other possible or probable causes of the damages by direct and competent
evidence. Stich negating' causation was absent in the case at bar.
The distinctions between the Farmers Grain case and the present case b
the Court are numerous and of critical importance. The evidence which was f
by this Court in the Farmers Grain case to be competent evidence, from which
jury could infer that the feed was deficient and that such deficiency proximatefy
caused the turkey grower's damages , even though no actual analysis of the feed
was made, included the following:

*

All feed eaten by defendant-counterclaimant's turkeys was purchased

the plaintiff-feed manufacturer.

*

There was a "control" group of all other turkey poults from the samell!1

hatches as defendant's poults, and from which a distinct contrast could readily
drawn when compared with defendant's poults. All poults in this "control"
were received by the turkey growers in good condition, as were defendant's P
none of the poults in the control group were fed Farmers Grain feed; all of the
in the control group had normal growth rates and no physical problems, whereas
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defendant's turkeys had dry feathers and cankerous mouths, and were stunted in
their growth .

*

Six poults from the same hatch, including defendant's poults were examined

at the Department of Veterinary Science at Utah State University; only defsndant's
poults showed a nutritional deficiency.

* An expert witness testified that defendant's brooding conditions were ideal
and that based on his examination of the poults he suspected vitamin deficiency.

*

All other turkey growers who purchased poults from the same hatches as

defendant, none of whom used Farmers Grain feed, testified that they had no problems with their turkeys.
The evidence presented in the instant case, however, was insufficient to
provide such a basis from which the jury could reasonably infer that the IFA feed
which defendant purchased was defective. In the case at bar, the following distinguishing evidence was presented:

*

Plaintiff's feed constituted less than one-half of the total matter consumed by

defendant's cows each day. Defendant's cows also ate alfalfa and corn silage in substantial quantities. (Tr. 1014; Ab. 135)

*

There was no control group to compare with the defendant's herd as to con-

ditions, feed, or physical problems. However, Exhibits 57-P through 63-P show
a comparison of defendant's milk production per cow with other Salt Lake County
herds. That comparison shows that in 1970 before defendant began using plaintiff's
feed, the milk production of his herd was less than the Salt Lake County average
and that the production of his herd increased steadily and by 1974 exceeded the Salt.
Lake County average by 1,688 pounds. (See pp. 3-4 of this Brief, supra.)
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*

No autopsies or examinations were ever performed on defendant's cow

determine what the specific problems with his cows were.

s to

(l'r. 1121-1122; Ab.

11

180)

*

Blair Thomas and Ferris Fitzgerald, other dairy farmers in defendant's

locality, testified as to their use of plaintiff's feed without adverse effects.

err.

1178, 796; Ab. 117, 121; Tr. 920-922; Ab. 214-215) See footnote 5, p. 38 ofthis
Brief, supra.
A factual situation similar to that in the Farmers Grain case existed in Park
v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 241 P .2d 914 (1952). Park brought an
action against Moorman for breach of warranty as to fitness of poultry feed concen
Moorman appealed the jury verdict in favor of Park, claiming that there was ins
evidence to justify the inference that Park's loss was the proximate result of the
use of either the feed produced by Moorman or the feeding plan propounded by
Moorman. In ii.ffirming the jury verdict, the Utah Supreme Court reasoned as fo
Appellant further contends that the evidence in this case is
insufficient to justify the inference that plaintiff's loss was
the proximate result of the use of either the feed or the method
of feeding or both. The record contains testimony of defendant's
own veterinarian that the feed or plan could have caused plaintiff's loss. There was further testimony of other witnesses who
had used the feed and had had undesirable results. The
inferences drawn by officers of defendant com_pany and by
buyers· from plaintiff that the chickens on defendant's feed
and plan were far below the other chickens on the other
plan, and that such condition came within a significant period
after defendant's feed and plan were adopted is further evidence
of proximate cause. This question of proximate cause is likewise a jury question. Taking the evidence most favorable to
the plaintiff, there is substantial evidence established by the
record to support the jury's implied finding as to proximate
cause of the loss. Id. at 920 . [Emphasis added.]
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The evidence presented in Park v. Moorman, supra was direct and persuasive in excluding other possible causes of damages, leaving the only reasonably
likely inference that the f~ed in question was the culprit. In the instant case, however, a much different situation is presented. Here, the evidence presented was
insufficient to raise either the inference that plaintiff's feed was deficient or the
inference that it proximately caused defendant's claimed damages. Dairy-farmers
Ferris Fitzgerald and Blair Thomas, testified that they had used plaintiff's feed
many years, including during the time periods pertinent to the present suit, but
never experienced any adverse effect. (Tr. 922; Ab. 215; Tr. 930; Ab. 218)
i

Unlike the situation in Park v. Moorman, supra, defendant did not introduce any
witnesses who could testify that they had problems when they used plaintiff's feed.

.I,

i'
ifl'i
:f:

Furthermore, Exhibits 57-P - 63-P, reflect yearly comparisons between the defendant's :1:
dairy during the material times in question, and the average of Salt Lake County
herds, which indicate that defendant's herd was constantly

in~reasing

i'

its production

in relation to the other herds in the test area. (Directly opposite from the situation
in Moorman.) As noted, defendant failed to introduce evidence to show , for example,
that weather conditions and seasonal changes, changes in the herd's location,
hoof trimming, disease and other obvious possible explanations did not cause a
reduction in milk production of the dairy herd and the other symptoms of Fitzgerald's
herd. (See pp. 13-20 of Brief, supra) Defendant's expert stated in his examination
that if a cow was fed excessive amounts of urea, in the grain, the symptoms of
such toxicity would be apparent from one-half hour up to three or four hours after
the consumption of excess urea, whereas defendant and his help testified that his
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cows were bloating from 8 to 12 hours after consuming the grain.

(Tr. 780-78!;

Ab. 117)

The Utah Court has recognized that use of circumstantial evidence to ere~·

"I

an inference of proximate cause is suspect and subject to scrutiny. Denver

&

R.G.R. Co. v. Ashton-Whyte-Skillicorn Co., 49 Utah 82, 162 Pac. 83 (1916);
Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 27 Utah 2d 419, 497 P .2d 28 (1972).

In the c&<

at bar, the circumstances which supposedly would create the inference of pro·
cause cannot stand the light of day. The circumstances could just as well be use'
to create an inference that any number of things may have caused the alleged p ·
and damages of defendant. For instance, several witnesses testified that there
were various milkers involved with defendant's cows, that the cows changed lo
and that these factors could cause milk production loss.

(Tr. 78; Ab. 106; Tr.

583; Ab. 63; Tr. 585; Ab. 68; Tr. 594; Ab. 69; Tr. 641; Ab. 81; Tr. 679; Ab.
89. See also pp. 13-16 of this Brief, supra.) Defendants expert was asked to ass
the directly contrary hypothesis that only

~

milker was involved .

(Tr. 739;

Ab. 107) Isn't there hereby created the logical and reasonable likelihood that
changes in milkers and locations caused milk production loss? Isn't that inferen
just as likely as that the plaintiff's feed caused the milk production loss, particu
when the unrefuted evidence showed actual increase in milk production of defeno
cows during the periods the animals were eating plaintiff's feed as compared to
previous when other feed was used? (See Exhibit 63-P and pp. 3-4 of this Brief.
supra.) Similar analysis could demonstrate the reasonable likelihood and plaus
of other factors as causative of the other problems asserted by plaintiff, such as
the effects of sickness in the herd, weather conditions, hoof trimming and other
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E. Insufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence to Create Inference of Damages
A universally recognized principle governing the recovery of damages is
that "damages must be certain, both in their nature and in respect to the cause
from which they proceed." This principle has been modified to allow the recovery
of damages where they are proved with only reasonable certainty; however, damages
are not recoverable when the trier of facts must rely upon evidence which leaves
those damages uncertain or speculative. Recognizing this principle, the Utah
Supreme Court in B. T. Moran, Inc. v. First Security Corporation, 82 Utah
316, 24 P .2d 384 (1933) stated that:
There is no finding of any fact on which damages in any
specific amount can rest . . . . The element of damages is
so speculative, and the cause of damages so uncertain on the
record before us, as to afford no basis for a judgment in favor
of the defendant. Id. at 389 , 390.
Accord: Security Development Co. v. Fedco, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 306, 462 P .2d
706 (1969); Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P .2d 121 (1965); and
Telluride Power Co. v. Williams, 172 F .2d 673 (10th Cir. 1949).
In the case at bar, no competent evidence was introduced upon which the
jury could reasonably base an award of damages. The testimony of the defendant

as to his damages was wholly unsupported, and in fact was soundly contradicted

lj'
11!

by many of defendant's own witnesses and exhibits. (See pp. 24-29 of Brief, supra.)

i'I,

!fr

Item: Defendant testified that 42 of his cows died of bloat caused by urea,
causing a loss of $33,000.00.

(Tr. 1042-1050; Ab. 145-147) Even assuming that

there was a causal connection (a point steadfastly denied), the DHIA records admitted
in evidence showed only 22 of defendant's cows as having died during the time
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in question (Tr. 333; Ab. 22), and defendant's milkers could testify only as to
seven cows that died of bloat.

(Tr. 610; Ab. 72; Tr. 661; Ab. 86; Tr. 680; Ab.

90)
Item: Defendant claimed that he had to sell 136 cows for beef because they
became unproductive as a result of consuming plaintiff's feed.

(Tr. 1076-1080;

Ab. 155-156; Tr. 1133-1142; Ab. 182-183; Tr. 1158-1167; Ab. 188-192) The
DHIA records admitted in evidence show that only 87 of defendant's cows were
soldforbeefduringthepertinenttimeperiods. (Tr. 334; Ab. 22)
In several instances, the testimony of defendant as to alleged damages was

based upon documents never admitted into evidence or excluded from evidence:
*Values defendant placed on the cow deaths were allegedly taken from his
tax records, which were never introduced into evidence, and the only exhibit
reflecting such losses, Exhibit 138, was refused admission into evidence by the
lower court.

(See p. 20 of Irief, supra.)

* Defendant referred to his unintroduced alleged tax records to determine
the losses he sustained by reason of the sale of his cows , but the only exhibit whi
set forth the defendant's claimed losses, Exhibit 146, was refused admission into
evidence.

(Seep. 20 of Brief, supra.)

Perhaps the most uncertain of all "evidence" as to damages was the unsupported claims by defendant as to which the jury was left to speculate:
Item: Defendant testified that he incurred $98,600 .00 in additional expens~
and costs in order to maintain his cows beyond the normal lactation period· (Tr.
1065-1069; ab. 152-153) No receipts, bills, cancelled checks, or bookkeeping
records were introduced to support defendant's claim.
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Item: Defendant claimed with respect to Count V, that he sustained alleged
increased costs to maintain his production level, as to Count VI that he sustained
additional costs for the greater volume of grain consumed, as to Count VII that there
was over payment because protein was deficient. In none of these instances, however, were the exhibits prepared by defendant regarding his claimed losses admitted
for jury consideration because they were prepared from documents not evidence,
such as the Dairy Herd Management article and the U .S .D .A. grain-milk ratios
relied on by defendant in computing his damages. (See pp. 27-28 ofthis Brief,
supra.) Such exhibits were rejected by the Court.
*Defendant claimed $124,053.00 in damages for loss of milk production.
Defendant prepared Exhibit 139 as to his milk losses from his alleged tax records
and the alleged Beatrice Foods-Meadow Gold Dairy receipts which were not offered
or introduced into evidence. (See pp. 22-23 of Brief, supra.) Exhibit 139 was
refused admission into evidence, but defendant nevertheless was permitted to
read from the refused exhibit verbatim to the jury.

(See pp. 22-23 of Brief, supra.)

No competent evidence on which to determine the amount of damages, if
any, was presented to the jury, and it is submitted that the evidence relating to
the award of over $226,000 .00 in damages was legally insufficient.
POINT IV.
PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED
IN THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
The errors assigned herein have to do with prejudicial admission of exhibits,
testimony based upon documents and matters not in evidence, conduct of defendant
in reading from exhibits which had been excluded or refused, and things of that
Sponsored
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A. Prejudicial Admission of Exhibits
It is submitted that admission into evidence of exhibits which were remote

in time and place, over strenuous and consistent objection of counsel, constituted
prejudicial error. This embraces all chemical tests and exhibits referred to at pi
6-9 of this Brief, which includes exhibits prior and subsequent to the relevant
times. The aforesaid exhibits were offered as related solely to notice (punitive
damages) , before the matter of negligence had been established or proved (whici
it never was) .

Proof of negligence was and is a foundational necessity before !hi

matter of punitive damages can be gone into. But in this case, the opposite procedure was employed: proof admittedly and pointedly pertinent only to punitive
damages was introduced, and then the jury was allowed to speculate and inferthi
that very evidence could be the basis for a finding of negligence. This is boots
ping at its worst.
In Menefee v. Blitz, 181 Ore. 100, 179 P. 2d 550, 561 (1947), the court hek

When the admissibility of an item of evidence is dependent
upon the submission of preliminary proof in the form of "a foundation" or, to use a different term a condition precedent, the~
who offers the dependent testimony must submit the preliminary
proof or establish the condition precedent before the dependent
fact can be deemed admissible. See Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd
Ed. , § 654, and 32 C .J. S. , Evidence, § 838, p. 768. The reception of dependent evidence in face of the fact that the preliminary
proof was never submitted constitutes error: 5 C .J .S., Appeal
and Error,§ 1725, p. 990. [Emphasis added.]
The admissibility of the aforesaid exhibits of alleged similar prior acts injected
collateral issues into the case and constituted error.
In negligence actions, the courts have generally ruled
inadmissible, on the issue of negligence or of contributory negligence at the time of the injury complained of, evidence of similar
prior acts of negligence of the defendant or the plaintiff on other
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occasions. To admit evidence of prior acts of negligence would, it
is said, inject collateral issues into the case and have a tendency
to confuse the minds of the jury . 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence , § 315
at 361.
B. Testimony Based upon Documents and Matters Not in Evidence
Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Evidence prohibits proof of the content of a
writing, other than by the writing itself, except in certain circumstances not
applicable in this case. That rule was violated in the extreme by permitting Mr.
Fitzgerald to read and testify from rejected exhibits as to the content of Internal
Revenue records, magazine articles and the like, which were referred to as the
basis of the testimony, but never marked as exhibits or introduced into evidence.
(See discussion infra, at pp. 20-23 of this Brief.)
A prime example of the prejudicial effect and grave injustice which came
about as a result of reference to non exhibits was the Beatrice Food ticket fiasco.
(See pp. 22-23 of this Brief.) This was so egregious that the jury wanted to look
at what it thought was a key set of damning exhibits, i.e., the Beatrice Food tickets,
but had to be told at the direction of the judge in an unrecorded communication
at the jury room that the tickets had never been introducted as exhibits. (See
p. 23 of the Brief, supra.)
The law is clear that testimony such as was given by defendant, not based
upon the personal knowledge of defendant, has no probative value and constitutes
error. Thus in Watson Land Co. v. Rio Grande Oil Co. , 61 C .A. 2d 269, 142
P. 2d 950, 953 (1943) the court stated:

The testimony of defendant's president, that the oil
his company was producing had a gravity of less than 14, had
no probative value, in view of facts that, as revealed by his
subsequent answers, he did not speak of his own knowledge,
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but based his statement on the "run tickets" of the refineries
which bought the products of his wells, and there was no
showing of the basis on which the run tickets were computed.

C. Conduct of Defendant in Reading from Exhibits Excluded or Refused
In determining the losses defendant claims to have sustained, he prepared

various summaries and charts containing detailed information as to how he arrive:
at his losses.

(See pp. 20-23 of this Brief, supra.) These summaries included:

Exhibits 138-D - "Cow Deaths"; Exhibit 139-D - "Milk Losses"; Exhibit 146-D.
"Cows Sold for Beef''; and Exhibit 163-D - "60 Retarded Cows." Each of these
exhibits were compiled through use of the DHIA records , (admitted in evidence)
defendant's alleged tax records, ~ot admitted in evidence) , his memory, and"
sources which he deems to be reliable." (Tr. 1042-1048;

Ab. 145-147; Tr. 1011

1080, 1133-1142, 1158-1167; Ab. 155-156, 182-183, 188-192; Tr. 1065-1069; Ab.
152-153; Tr. 1074-1076; Ab. 154-155; Tr. 1157-1158; Ab. 188; Tr. 1050-1053;Ab
148-149) The DHIA records were previously received into evidence, but did nol
contain all the information contained on the proposed exhibits, such as cause old
reason culled, value of cow , or value of lost milk production , if any . The def
alleged tax records were never introduced nor offered into evidence, even thoug~
his alleged tax records supposedly contained such information as cow deaths,
and cause of death, cows sold for beef, and the reason for such sale, and
losses thereby sustained, and receipts for the sale of milk to dairies, such 85
the Beatrice Foods-Meadow Gold Dairy receipts.

(See pp. 20-23 of Brief, ~.)

The aforesaid information from the alleged tax records was crucial to the claimed
values in connection with loss of milk production. Each of the aforesaid exhibits
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were offered into evidence, but the Court reserved ruling thereupon until after
cross-examination by the plaintiff. (Exhibit 138-D; Tr. 1049; Ab. 147; Exhibit
146-D; Tr. 1077; Ab. 155; Exhibit 139-D; Tr. 1054; Ab. 149; Exhibit 163-D; Tr.
1079-1081; Ab. 156) The Court thereafter properly sustained plaintiff's objection
as to each said exhibit and refused admission of Exhibits 138-D, 139-D, 146-D,
and 163-D into evidence. (Tr. 1153-1156; Ab . 186-18 7)
Although the aforesaid exhibits were refused, the unsubstantiated information
contained in those exhibits was nevertheless presented directly to the jury,
for its full consideration, by way of defendant's verbatim reading of those exhibits.

A comparison of the proposed exhibits to defendant's testimony with respect to
cow deaths, sale of cows for beef, retarded cows and loss of milk production readily
confirms the fact the defendant read from the refused exhibits. (Exhl"bit 138-D;
Tr. 1042-1048; Ab. 145-147; Exhibit 139-D; Tr. 1076-1080, 1133-1142; 1158-1167;
Ab. 155-156, 182-183, 188-192; Exhibit 146-D; Tr. 1065-1069; 1074-1076, 1157-1158;
Ab. 152-153, 154-155, 189; Exhibit 163-D; Tr. 1050-1053;· Ab. 148-149)
With respect to defendant's reading of Exhibit 146-D "Cows Sold for Beef"
a discussion was held between the court and defendant's counsel during which
the court, recognizing the questionable propriety of such conduct, refused to
permit Mr. Fitzgerald to read from that proposed exhibit or the notes he used in
the preparation thereof.

(Tr. 1081-1085; Ab . 156-158) Notwithstanding, after

Exhibit 146-D was refused admission into evidence, the court permitted the defendant to "Start at the front and go clear through" that exhibit, (Tr. 1158; Ab. 188)
reading all the information from that refused exhibit directly into the record.
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The court, noting that the milk production information contained on the refused
exhibit could be searched out from the DHIA records, suggested that the defendant
read only the cow number, percentage of the herd and the loss sustained categori
from the exhibit, (Tr. 1162-1163; Ab. 190) i.e. , the very information from defen
alleged tax records not introduced into evidence which was the basis for the couM:
refusal to admit the exhibits into evidence.

(Tr. 188-189; Ab. 187)

The information contained in proposed Exhibits 138-D, 139-D, 146-D and
163-D, deemed insufficient by the court to be admitted as exhibit evidence, was
nevertheless before the jury, for its evaluation by reason of defendant's sole
testimony. The jury was at no time admonished to disregard that information
read to them by the defendant from the exhibits refused into evidence.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is submitted that substantial error was
committed in the long and confusing trial of this case. Evidence admitted or
limited to the narrow issue of punitive damages was permitted to be considered
by the jury for all purposes. Circumstantial evidence relating to one or perhaps
two samples of allegedly contaminated feed out of many samples of unadulterated
feed was regarded by the court as justifying a virtual direction that the issue
of negligence was established as a matter of law. Incompetent evidence was
admitted upon which inferences were constructed--with the result that an inferen
of negligence became the basis for an inference of proximate cause. Testimony
directly from excluded or refused exhibits was permitted, as was testimony based
upon hearsay records never offered or admitted into evidence. The evidence
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on damages was speculative and uncertain. In short, it is submitted that under
the totality of the circumstances, it would be manifest injustice not to reverse the
verdict of the jury.
This Court should reverse the judgment in favor of defendant on the
Counterclaim and direct the trial court to grant plaintifrs Motion for Directed
Verdict. Attorney's fees should be added to the judgment in favor of plaintiff
as a matter of law . In the alternative, this Court should vacate the verdict and
remand the case for new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
CALLISTER, GREENE
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NEBEKER

~D>~C.
PllilL
orothYCPleshe.
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Ut1$ 84133

DeLyle H. Condie
1224 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
DATED: February 28, 1977.
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